Abstract. Multi-objective games generalize normal form games. Each agent individually evaluates each overall action profile by a multi-objective (MO) vector, instead of a single-objective (SO) scalar, enabling to model partial rationalities. For the purpose of measuring thoroughly the efficiency of MO games, we generalize the price of anarchy (PoA). It avoids critical losses of information due to a scalarization of the multi-dimensional payoffs. In order to assess this new MO-PoA, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm. (The model falls outside the classical framework of smoothness-analysis.) As a proof-of-concept, we provide an analysis of a real-life example, along with experiments on normal forms.
politics of businesses, industries and nations. But, in this example, are the 6.10 6 loss of lives per year something positive? What is the value of a cigarette? According to the objective theory of value [2, 21, 27] , the value of a cigarette amounts to the raw materials used for its production, linearly combined to the labour time put into it. Fixing the weighted combination of raw materials and labour time, imposes one precise industrial point of view. However, in the evaluation and decision processes of an economy, in order to keep their good will, each agent (producer, consumer), deserves to keep the freedom to evaluate and act how he pleases (produce, consume). Therefore, according to the subjective theory of value [22, 34] , the value of a cigarette amounts to the price an agent is willing to pay for it, disregarding what the disastrous consequence is on his life expectancy. This is one example among many, which shows that making evaluations and decisions based solely on financial data can cause a wide-scale loss on other critical objectives, like life-expectancy or sustainability.
There is worldwide a growing awareness of these wide economic malfunctions, and researchers from various domains have started to study economy with new approaches. The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) was proposed as a measurement of economic growth, taking account of social and environmental objectives [7] . Recently, thanks to the economists and politicians from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), firms, institutions, and nations started to register more than just financial reports [11] . They now have to report on 40 to 79 criteria, including economic, sustainability, human-rights and responsibility criteria. In operation-research, the field of multiple criteria decision making is deeply developed [25, 32] . The game theoretician's agenda is to provide: (1) a model rich enough to explain the economic malfunctions described above, (2) measurements informative enough for the several efficiencies of economic models, (3) tools for the assessment of these measurements, and (4) analyses of these measurements. The theory of MO games maintains vectorial evaluations. This conciliates both the (a) objective and (b) subjective value theories. (a) The components of the evaluation vectors (individual and utilitarian) keep the multi-objective information, by dropping weighted combinations. (b) Each agent, coordinator and reader is free to express his subjectivity by scalarizing and ordering the evaluation vectors how he pleases in his individual decision 3 . The price to pay for this new approach is that of dealing with non-scalarized evaluations: MO games maintain more information and calculus is not as easy as with scalars. Analytical approaches fall outside the classical frameworks and yield deadends. (e.g. Smoothness-analysis [30] fails.) This paper aims to highlight how computer science could enable the management of this mass of information and provide the calculus of the necessary measurements, by starting from the fundamental normal forms.
Paper outline. Firstly, Section 2 clarifies the notations, provides didactic and reallife examples, and related work. Then, Section 3 defines a multi-objective price of anarchy (MO-PoA) as a measurement for the efficiency of MO games. It is illustrated on a critical real-life example. Analytical approaches on the MO-PoA yield major deadends (Section 4). As analytic issues in Mathematics lead to the creation of numerical analysis, we do not consider this as a failure. Section 5 contributes a polynomial-time algorithm, for computing, given a MO normal form, the MO-PoA. Finally, we show the insights of the MO-PoA on random MO normal forms.
Let N = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n} denote the set of agents. Let A i denote each agent i's actionset (discrete, finite). Each agent i decides an action a i ∈ A i . Given a subset of agents M ⊆ N , let A M denote × i∈M A i and let A = A N denote the set of overall actionprofiles. Let O = {1, . . . , k, . . . , d} denote the set of all the objectives, with d fixed.
Definition 1 (Multi-objective Game [33] ). A MO game is a tuple N, {A i } i∈N , O, {v i } i∈N where N is the set of agents, {A i } i∈N are their individual action-sets, O is the set of all objectives and for each agent i,
MO games encompass single-objective (discrete) optimization problems (for d = 1 objective and n = 1 agent), MO optimization problems (for d ≥ 1 and n = 1) and non-cooperative games (for d = 1 and n ≥ 1). Let us assume α = |A i | ∈ N, for each agent i. Then, the representation of a MOG requires nα n d-dimensional vectors. The complexity of an algorithm taking a MOG as an input, must be established with respect to the length L = nα n d. Let us now supply the vectors with a preference relation. Assuming a maximization setting, given x, y ∈ R d + , the following relations state respectively that y (1) weakly-Pareto-dominates and (2) Pareto-dominates x:
A pair of vectors can be incomparable (e.g. (1, 2) and (2, 1)). Hence, the Pareto-dominance is a partial order, inducing a multiplicity of Pareto-efficient outcomes. Formally, the set of efficient vectors is defined as follows:
For instance, in Figure 1 (Section 3), given the set of vectors Y = u(A) (the blue dots), the subset of Pareto-efficient vectors is EFF[u(A)] ⊆ u(A) (the red crosses). The Pareto-dominance enables to define as efficient all the trade-offs that cannot be improved on one objective without being downgraded on another one, that is: the best compromises between objectives. Similarly, we denote the subset of worst vectors by
It is worth noting that if a vector y + maximizes a positive linear combination of the objectives λ ∈ R p ++ (that is: ∀y ∈ Y, λ.y + ≥ λ.y), then y + is necessarily Pareto-efficient. Given an overall action-profile a ∈ A, a M is the restriction of a to A M , and a
−i
to A N \{i} . At the individual scale, the Pareto-efficency defines a partial rationality, enabling to model situations that SO games would not model consistently. Indeed, it is less demanding (and thus more realistic) to assume that an agent's individual rationality will lead to a Pareto-efficient decision/choice. It induces the following stability concept.
Definition 3 (Pareto-equilibrium [33] ). Given a MOG, an overall action-profile a ∈ A is a Pareto equilibrium (denoted by a ∈ PE), if and only if, for each agent i ∈ N , we have:
For a Pareto-equilibrium, each agent's individual action is Pareto-efficient in his actionset. For d = 1, Pareto-equilibria amount to pure strategy Nash equilibria. For d > 1, Pareto-equilibria encompass many relevant action-profiles. Indeed, whatever the subjective positive weighted combination of the objectives applied by an agent, the decision is included in Pareto-efficiency. Hence, the possible equilibria are encompassed, even when the agents' individual scalarizing functions are unknown. Consequently, this model enables the existence of each agent's individual subjectivity. Moreover, it maintains the information on each objective. We will distinguish the objectives that deserve an efficiency study and the purely behavioural objectives that do not deserve an efficiency study, but are despite used to determine PE. Related work. The related work about multi-objective games is disparate. Pureactions will remain our sole interest in this paper, hence we are out of the scope of PPAD-completeness [9] , and we have to justify the existence of Pareto-equilibria. For SO games, it is well known that in many sound probabilistic settings [8, 10, 14, 28] , the number of pure-strategy equilibria follows a Poisson(1) probability distribution, with an expectancy of 1. But when d > 1, Pareto-efficiency is less demanding on the conditions of individual rationality, and there are multiple Pareto-efficient responses. Consequently, we strongly suspect the number of pure PE to be numerous in average:
d n , justifying their existence in a probabilistic manner. Furthermore, in MO games with MO potentials [23, 26, 29] , the existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed. Also, it is worth noting that the higher generality of our model (compared to the Price of Anarchy (PoA) [19] ) makes it fall outside of the dogma of Smoothness-analysis [30] , on which most known results rely [3, 4, 6, 12] . In other words, instead of analytical results on subclasses of games, we rather show that the MO-PoA needs to be computed.
Didactic and real-life examples. We provide two examples of MO games. The first example is a didactic toy-example. It shows a simple multi-objective graphical game, and illustrates the Pareto equilibrium concept. The second example is real-life and models the tobacco industry and its consumers.
Example 1 (A didactic toy-example, the MOGG of Ocean Shores). Graphical games (GG) [17, 18] provide compact representations of massively multiagent games when the evaluation function of each agent only depends on a local subset of the agents. Formally, there is an interaction digraph G = (N, E) where each vertex represents an agent, and an agent i's evaluation function only depends on the actions of the agents in his inner-neighbourhood ) ∈ PE, since each of these individual actions, given the adversary local action profile (column), is Pareto-efficient among the two actions of the agent (row). In this MO game, there are 13 such Pareto-equilibria. Their utilitarian evaluations are in Figure 1 (Section 3).
Example 2 (Real-life example: The tobacco industry and its consumers [1, 20] ). The first agent is the tobacco industry. The remaining set of agents is for the n − 1 = 6.10 9 prospective consumers of the tobacco industry. That is, N = {tobacco-industry, (n − 1) consumers}. Each consumer can decide to consume cigarettes, or not: A consumer = {not-smoking, smoking}. He cares about living, his money and the rewards of consumption: physical relaxation and a cowboy's ego. The tobacco-industry only cares about money and decides between existing or not; if 'exist' is decided, an advertising campaign can be decided to foster consumption and higher prices: A tobacco-industry = {not-exist, exist, advertise&exist}. We have O = {money, reward, life-expectancy} as overall objectives. Since the addictive reward is an ordinal behavioural objective (and not an efficiency measurement), money and life-expectancy are the two objectives on which the efficiency analysis will further focus. The tables below depict the evaluation vectors (ordered as in O and summed over the course of a life-time) of one prospective consumer and the evaluations per-consumer of the tobacco-industry. Let θ ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} be the number of consumers who decide to smoke. Per-consumer means that the evaluation of tobacco-industry is θ times line 2 (smoking) plus n − 1 − θ times line 1 (not-smoking). Money is expressed in thousands of dollars (representing an aggregation of objectives); the addictive reward is in {1, 2, 3, 4} (ordinal scale); lifeexpectancy is given in years (a physical and philosophical objective). The cigarette expenses of a smoker are estimated to 48k$ over the course of a lifetime. The cost-perconsumer of forty years of international advertising campaigns (to cover a lifetime) is estimated to 20$ and can be neglected. The production cost per-consumer over a lifetime is estimated to 10k$. The consumer's addictive satisfaction was modelled by 1 for not smoking, 2 for being sensitive to advertisements, 3 for satisfying a physical addiction, and 4 for satisfying the psychological addiction caused by advertising campaigns. In this model, a consumer's payoff does not depend on the other consumers. On the action profiles {not-exist, exist} × {not-smoking, smoking}, if the consumer decides not-smoking or the industry decides not-exist, then nothing happens (no consumption nor production), the industry earns nothing, and the consumer saves 48k$, feels no addictive satisfaction (1) and has a standard life expectancy (70 years). If the industry decides to exist and the consumer decides to smoke, the industry earns 36 − 10 = 26k$, and the consumer spends 36k$, is physically satisfied (3) and loses 10 years of life expectancy. Finally, if the industry decides to advertise, a proportion of the consumers who decided not to smoke, will nevertheless be psychologically attracted by smoking (satisfaction 2), and might end up smoking. This deforms the evaluation vector of the non-smoker towards a smoker's evaluation vector. For a smoker, satisfaction is both physical and psychological (4; feels like a cowboy), the cigarette expenses use the 48k$ individual budget, and he loses 15 years of life expectancy. Pareto equilibria. If the industry decides to advertise&exist, then for the consumer, deciding not to smoke, or to smoke, depends on how the consumer subjectively values/weighs money, addictive satisfaction and life expectancy. Pareto-efficiency encompasses the relevant decisions of the consumer, even if we don't know his subjective combination weights. Indeed, both not-smoking and smoking (evaluated (40, 2, 65) and (0, 4, 55)) are Pareto-efficient. For the industry, advertise&exist is always a dominant strategy, and for the consumer, both not-smoking and smoking are Pareto-efficient in each case. Consequently, the set of Pareto-equilibria is {{advertise&exist} × × consumers {not-smoking, smoking}} = PE. Some economists would say: "Since consumers value the product, then the industry creates value." However, these Pareto-equilibria are the worst action-profiles for money and life-expectancy.
While this paper starts with the efficiency of MO normal forms, these two examples exhibit interesting compacity structures to which further works will be devoted. In the next section, the efficiency of MO games is formally defined, in order to assess it.
It is well known in game theory that an equilibrium can be overall inefficient with regard to the sum of the individual evaluations. This loss of efficiency is bounded by the price of anarchy min[u(P E)]/ max[u(A)] (PoA 4 ) [19, 31] , which held recently a wide interest [3, 4, 6, 12, 30] . Regrettably, when focusing on one sole objective (e.g. making money or a higher GDP), there are losses of efficiency that cannot be observed: nonsustainability of productions, poor quality of life for workers abroad, production of carcinogens, and many others. This appeals for a more thorough analysis of the loss of efficiency at equilibrium. In this section, we define a multi-objective price of anarchy.
Given a function f :
The utilitarian social welfare u : A → R -E = u(PE) the set of equilibria outcomes.
-F = EFF[u(A)] the set of efficient outcomes.
For SO games, the worst-case efficiency of equilibria outcomes is bounded by the so-called price of anarchy min[u(P E)]/ max[u(A)]. But for MO games, there are many equilibria and optima, and a ratio of the green set E over the red set F ought to maintain each critical information.
The utilitarian vectors of all the action-profiles of Ocean Shores Firstly, for one equilibrium-outcome y ∈ E, let us quantify its guaranteed efficiency ratios ρ ∈ R d + . Recall that in this maximization setting, a guaranteed efficiency ratio ρ is a lower bound on the efficiency ratios at the equilibrium; e.g.: if ρ = (0.8, 0.25), then it guarantees 80% of efficiency on the first objective and 25% of efficiency on the second objective. In the SO case, this amounts to {ρ ∈ R | ρ ≤ y / max[u(A)]} and means that y is at least as efficient as ρ max[u(A)]. If we decided to which efficient outcome z ∈ F, the equilibrium y should be compared to, then we would impose an overall point-of-view, causing a bias and maybe a dictatorship. So, with flexibility, we do not take side with any efficient-outcome. The freedom degree of choosing what precise efficient-outcome an equilibrium should be compared to is left free, yielding multiple efficiency ratios. Indeed, in the MO case, an efficiency ratio ρ ∈ R d + will only mean that there exists at least one efficient outcome z ∈ F such that y is at least as efficient as ρ z. That is: y ∈ (ρ F
∀y ∈ E, ∃z ∈ F, y ρ z Hence, the set of guaranteed ratios is:
This means that for each y ∈ E, there is an efficient outcome z (y) ∈ F such that y dominates ρ z (y) . In other words, if ρ ∈ R[E, F], then each equilibrium accords on the satisfiability of the ratio of efficiency ρ. That is: Figure 2) .
Thirdly, if two bounds on the efficiency ρ and ρ are such that ρ ρ , then ρ brings no more information and there is no need to know ρ . Consequently, MO-PoA is defined by using EFF on the guaranteed efficiency ratios, as the following set of tight ratios:
Definition 5 (MO Price of Anarchy). Given a MOG, we define the MO-PoA as:
That is: equilibriaoutcomes are at least as good as ρ F. Moreover, since ρ is tight, E sticks to ρ F. Firstly, for some overall subjectivities, the guaranteed efficiency on objective 2 is already total (100%, if not more), while we can only guarantee 50% on the objective 1. Secondly, for each ρ ∈ R[E, F], we have ρ 1 ≤ 65%. Hence, whatever the subjective overall efficiency, one cannot guarantee more than 65% of efficiency on the objective 1. Thirdly, from 50% to 65% of guaranteed efficiency on the objective 1, the various overall subjectivities trade the guaranteed efficiency on the objective 2 from (resp.) 100% to 75%.
The striking power of the MO-PoA in Example 3 relies in its total respect and conservation of each subjective point-of-view about what the overall efficiency should be. It also conserves the information on all efficiency objectives, achieving some sort of compatibility with both the objective and subjective value theories.
Example 4 (The efficiency of the tobacco industry and the consumer).
In the efficiency analysis, we ignore the very subjective addictive reward, but not money, nor life-expectancy. Hence, as far as we are concerned, the sole efficient outcome is F = {(n−1).(48, −, 70)}. We still maintain the addictive reward in the agent's behaviour, in order to keep all the equilibria of the encompassing behavioural model, but we do not consider addiction in the overall evaluations. Hence, the equilibria outcomes are
where n−1 is the world's population, and θ the number of smokers. Note that WST[E] = {(38, −, 55)}. Consequently, here, the MO-PoA is the singleton {(38/48, −, 55/70)}. This means that in the worst case, we can lose up to 10k$ and 15 years of life-expectancy per-consumer. This critical information was not lost by the multi-objective price of anarchy, achieving our proof-of-concept.
In order to assess the MO-PoA, the next sections show the dead-ends of an analytical approach, and then provide algorithmic tools.
4 Analytical Approaches to MO-PoA: Major Dead-ends
Generalizing Smoothness Arguments to MO Games
Most known (SO) PoA results rely on a smoothness-analysis [30] . A crucial step for smoothness-analysis is to sum the best response inequalities, as follows. Take a SO game and an equilibrium a ∈ PE. From the best-response conditions ∀i ∈ N,
However, the Pareto-equilibrium conditions are rather:
As shown in the following counter-example, such relations cannot be summed: 
, then J contains more equilibria. Hence more anarchy is suspected in J. Therefore, the MO-PoA should be worse than each linear (SO) PoA. (e.g.: In this maximization setting, the MO-PoA should be farther from 1 than the (SO) PoA.) While this is often true, it cannot be generalized as shown in Example 5 (see e.g. its conclusion).
Example 5 (MO-PoA not related to (SO) PoA). N = {row, column}, A row = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }, A column = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 } and d = 2. The row (resp. column) agent chooses the row (resp. column). For a small ε > 0 the evaluations are: c 2 ) , (r 2 , c 1 )}, E = {(2, 3), (3, 2)} and F = {(1+ε)(2, 3), (1−ε)(3, 3), (1+ ε)(3, 2)}. Consequently, we have: Less linearly, the whole set of Pareto equilibria was completely characterized as the set of equilibria of the many SO games constructed using all the Tchebycheff scalarizations [36] . Unfortunately, Tchebycheff scalarizations are non-linear, which does not enable to transfer results and provide valid boundaries on the MO-PoA.
We do not consider this section as a failure to assess the MO-PoA. Facing a difficult analysis, we are left with no other choice than computing the MO-PoA, as in the following section.
Polynomial-time Computation of the MO-PoA
In this section, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of MOPoA, for MOGs given in MO normal form, which representation length is L = nα n d.
Theorem 1 (Polynomial time Computation of the MO-PoA).
Given a MO normal form, one can compute the MO-PoA in polynomial time:
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on a very general procedure based on two phases:
1. Given a MOG, compute the worst equilibria WST[E] and the efficient outcomes F. 
Given WST[E] and F, compute MO-
PoA = EFF[ R[ WST[E] , F ] ].
Phase 1: Computing the Efficient Outcomes and the Worst Equilibria
Proof. Due to lack of space, we omit the detailed proof. Algorithm 1 is the iterative development of the intersection ∩ y∈WST[E] ∪ z∈F C(y/z), by proceeding on some setalgebra. Though this development seems to yield m q terms (cone representations), one can prove that in fact, it remains polynomial.
For fixed d, this section provided a polynomial time algorithm for the computation of the MO-PoA, given a MO normal form. Moreover, in practice, the sizes of WST [E] and F are much smaller than O(α n ). Section 6 assessed this procedure's practicality. The formal polynomial-time comes from the fact that the normal form is a non-compact representation, with respect to the number of agents n.
We now provide numerical experiments on random MO normal form games, focusing and depicting the efficiency analysis on the two first objectives k = 1, 2. The other objectives k > 2 are purely behavioural. Although random MO normal forms are only of fundamental interest, this is the most general starting point, and several observations follow. The MO-PoA of each MOG was assessed by using Theorem 1, yielding for instance the output in Example 6.
Example 6 (The MO-PoA of one MOG with n = 7 agents, d = 2 objectives, α = 3 actions-per-agent, and independent evaluations drawn uniformly in {1, . . . , 100}). ρ 2
The white part corresponds to the set of guaranteed ratios of efficiency
, then there exists an un-efficient equilibrium y ∈ E, such that whatever z ∈ F, the guarantee y ρ z (y) does not hold. In other words, for each ρ ∈ R[E, F], it holds that each equilibrium has at least ρ times some efficiency.
The Model with Independent Random Evaluations
We did experiments on normal forms with n = 2, 3, 4, 5 agents, d = 2, 3, 4 objectives, and α = 2, . . . , 6 actions-per-agent. Each evaluation v i k (a) was drawn independently and uniformly in {1, . . . , 100}. For each tuple (n, d, α), we drew 100 random MOGs, and averaged their MO-PoA. Each square in Table 1 corresponds to such an average MO-PoA. Recall that we focus the efficiency analysis on the two first objectives and that the following objectives are purely behavioural.
Observations. The symmetry (with respect to objectives) of this random MOG sampling is reflected in the symmetry of the average MO-PoA. The most striking observation is the negative impact of the number of purely behavioural objectives on the MOPoA: as the former grows, the later decreases. One can also note the negative impact of the number of agents n and of the number of actions-per-agent α, on the MO-PoA.
Random Evaluations with Dependencies Between Agents
In Table 2 , we fixed d = 3 objectives. The efficiency analysis is focused on the two first objectives, and the last objective is purely behavioural. We also fixed n = 5 agents and α = 3 actions-per-agent. This time, we introduced positive and negative dependencies between agents, represented by a vector s ∈ {0, +, −} d . (Recall that the last component of s is indexed by the behavioural objective.) For k ∈ O with positive dependencies γ ∈ R d + , we first draw a MOG with independent evaluations. Then, for each a ∈ A, we draw uniformly a number U k (a) ∈ {1, . . . , 100} and we add γU k (a) to v Table 2 depicts various MO-PoA averages (over 100 random MOGs), depending on the sign of the dependencies s (rows) and their intensity γ (columns).
Observations. When the efficiency objectives have positive dependencies between agents ((s 1 s 2 ) = (++)), the MO-PoA lowers significantly. This may be due to the fact that it induces more equilibria. When only the first efficiency objective has a positive dependency between agents, the guaranteed efficiency on this objective 1 lowers significantly, while the efficiency on objective 2 keeps the same. This effect is emphasized by a positive dependency in the behavioural objective, and attenuated by a negative one. A negative dependency between agents in objective 2 has a similar (but lesser) impact.
Conclusion
Discussion of the results. In this paper, multi-objective games [33] are reintroduced, as a model which makes less assumptions on the preferences of each agent. This super-class of non-cooperative normal form games is shown (on a real-life example) to maintain information on the various objectives of economic models. A measure for MOGs' efficiency is defined: the multi-objective price of anarchy (MO-PoA). It does not make any stance on what efficiency should exactly be, and maintains critical information which would otherwise be lost. The formal analysis of the MO-PoA is far more difficult than in the single-objective case, as most of the techniques known fail to provide valid boundaries. Pareto-efficiency encompasses many partially rational behaviours, and that does Table 2 : Average MO-PoAs in MOGs with n = 5, d = 3, α = 3, and the dependencies s.
not allow for the usual mathematical proofs. For the assessment of the MO-PoA, a polynomial-time algorithm is provided for MO normal forms. The size of this input is an exponential of the number of agents n.
Prospects. While this algorithmic work holds for normal forms, it does not hold for massively multi-agent games. It should be extended to compact game representations, like for instance MO graphical games or MO action-graph games. The real-life Example 2 suggests the use of an anonymity structure, and this work could be extended to multi-objective action-graph games. Action-graph games [5, 9, 15, 16 ] are a graphical model for game theory, which -for massively multi-agent games -can be even more compact than graphical games, when the game holds an anonymity structure. This way, the multi-objective efficiency of multi-objective generalizations of auctions or Cournotcompetitions [12, 13, 24] could be studied. This would enable a proper economic model and new insights explaining other critical economic malfunctions. We believe that there is space for an efficiency measure of equilibria to be defined, for the average case.
Regarding mixed strategies, we think that the Pareto-Nash definition [33] needs more work, because a pure strategy Pareto-equilibrium is not necessarily a mixed strategy Pareto-Nash equilibrium.
A Detailed Proofs
This Appendix is not intended to appear in the proceedings. The paper does not refer to it. , then there exists y ∈ E such that y y . Moreover, since is transitive and irreflexive, and E is finite, by iterating the previous step, we can find in WST[E] a y such that y y . Since y ∈ WST[E], then there exists z ∈ F such that y ρ z. Hence, we have: y y ρ z. This implies that y ρ z, which means that the ratio ρ also holds in R[E, F].
Proof (Example 5, statement on the MO-PoA). We prove the statement that MO-PoA = {((1 + ε) (3, 3) , (1 + ε)(3, 2)}. Therefore, the efficiency ratios of (2, 3) and (3, 2) are:
where for X ⊆ R d + , we denote C(X) = ∪ x∈X C(x). At this point, there are two methods. (1) You draw the cone-unions on a piece of paper; you intersect them; and you realize that MO-PoA = {((1 + ε) 
By the symmetry of E and F with respect to objectives, we focus on λ 1 ≤ 1/2:
This is a non-decreasing function of λ 1 , which minimum is PoA(0), and which maximum is PoA(1/2). Consequently, we have:
A. y∈WST[E] z∈F C(y/z), by restricting a set-algebra to the following objects: Definition 6 (Cone-Union). For a set of vectors X ⊆ R d + , the Cone-Union C(X) is:
Let C denote the set of all cone-unions of R d + .
To define an algebra on C, one can supply C with ∪ and ∩.
Lemma 1 (On the Set-Algebra (C, ∪, ∩)). Given two descriptions of cone-unions
Given two descriptions of cones
we have:
where
is stable, and then is a set-algebra.
B Table of Notations
This Appendix is not intended to appear in the proceedings. The paper does not refer to it. Tables 3, 4 and 5 contain the main notations used throughout the paper. Please feel free to use them, to make your reading more comfortable. 
